The paper **shatters the illusion of source code trust**. A compromised compiler can insert *undetectable* backdoors (e.g., a "Trojan horse" in the C compiler that recompiles itself to hide the flaw). My threat model now assumes **all toolchain components (compiler, linker, build scripts) are untrustworthy**—even if source code is clean.  

**Defense strategy**:  
1. **Bootstrapped validation**: Recompile the compiler from a *verified, minimal source* (e.g., a self-hosting C compiler written in a different language like Go), then cross-verify the binary against the source *using an independent toolchain*.  
2. **Air-gapped build chains**: For critical systems, build tools in an isolated environment with **no network access**. Use N-version programming (multiple independent implementations of the same function) to detect backdoors.  
3. **Hardware-anchored trust**: Use a TPM to verify the integrity of the compiler *before* it runs. If the TPM is compromised, fall back to a *physically isolated* "clean room" build process.  
4. **"Trust no code, trust people"**: For high-value systems, only deploy code built by **vetted, trusted teams** in a process with *real-time, multi-party auditing*. If you can’t verify the toolchain, assume it’s compromised—**no source code is safe**.  

*Paranoid but rational: The toolchain is the new attack surface. If the compiler is evil, the entire system is compromised—no amount of code review helps. Trust the people, not the tools.*