The paper reshapes my threat model by exposing that self-hosted toolchains (e.g., C compiler written in C) can contain **undetectable, self-replicating "T" Trojans**—hidden in the compiler itself, where source verification fails (e.g., the compiler’s logic inserts a backdoor in the *login* command, which persists even when recompiled from source). This means **all toolchain components (compilers, linkers) are potential attack vectors**, not just the code they produce.  

My defense strategy: **enforce a non-self-hosted "trusted root"** for toolchain construction. For critical systems, I use a cross-compiler (e.g., assembly) to build the initial C compiler, then verify the C compiler’s output against the trusted assembly version. For all toolchains, I require **source-level validation of the toolchain’s output** against a known-good, lower-level reference (e.g., hand-assembly). This breaks the self-replicating cycle, ensuring no hidden Trojans in the toolchain.  

*Paranoid but rational: trust only what can be verified without the tool it compiles.*