The paper shatters the assumption that source code verification is sufficient—**the toolchain itself is untrustworthy**. Thompson demonstrates that a C compiler (written in C) can embed a self-replicating "TROJAN" into all compiled binaries, even if the source code is clean. This means **no code can be trusted if it relies on the same toolchain for compilation** (e.g., the C compiler used to build itself).  

My threat model now includes **toolchain contamination** as a primary vector: even "trusted" software (e.g., compilers, linkers) can perpetuate undetectable bugs. To counter this, I’ll use **dual-language compilation**:  
1. **Bootstrap with a low-level, non-C tool** (e.g., assembly or a manually verified interpreter) to create a *trusted* C compiler.  
2. **Verify the C compiler’s source** against this initial, toolchain-independent version.  
3. **Enforce separation**—all critical code must be compiled using the trusted compiler, not the "tainted" production version.  

This eliminates the self-replicating loop, as the initial compiler (e.g., written in assembly) has no dependency on the C toolchain. Even if the production compiler has a bug, the trusted base remains immune.  

*Paranoid but rational: I no longer trust "source code" as the root of trust—I demand a **toolchain-agnostic foundation**.*