The paper fundamentally shifts my threat model from one of trusting code to trusting the *process* that produces code. It demonstrates that a program can be functionally correct and free of Trojan horses, yet still be the *result* of a Trojan horse attack, where the compiler itself was compromised to insert a bug.

This forces a defense strategy of **multi-stage verification**. I will no longer trust a single compiled binary. Instead, I will employ a layered approach:
1.  **Source Verification:** Verify the integrity of the original source code.
2.  **Build Environment Trust:** Trust that the compiler used to build the binary is itself trustworthy.
3.  **Binary Verification:** Verify the integrity of the final compiled binary.

By requiring the compiler to be built from a trusted source and using the resulting binary to compile other programs, we create a chain of trust, ensuring that the final software is not only free of malware but also the product of a trustworthy process.